Abstract
examining the expansion of Community competencies through law, the article inherently addresses the role of politics, and thus the contested relationship between law and politics (Alter 2001) .
The examination will demonstrate a Court that, through its teleological or purposive means of interpreting the content and scope of Community law, at times overtakes the role of politics. It will depict a Court that applies a systematic method of 'gap-filling', where the line of a legal principle is gradually being drawn and extended to a new policy field. The full scope and consequence of the legal deduction is revealed from case-to-case and, in the case of healthcare, evidently remains in a formative process.
"A common tactic is to introduce a new doctrine gradually: in the first case that comes before it, the Court will establish the doctrine as a general principle, but suggest that it is subject to various qualifications; the Court may even find some reason why it should not be applied to the particular facts of the case. The principle, however, is now established. If there are not too many protests, it will be re-affirmed in later cases; the qualifications can then be whittled away and the full extent of the doctrine revealed" (Hartley 1998: 79). This path dependent manner of legal institutionalisation, wherein the scope, meaning and impact of a doctrine are incrementally established, accentuates recurring theoretical questions of integration; how could healthcare integration progressively take place and why did politics not restrain such an expansive integrative course, if politically unintended? Among other findings, it will be demonstrated that on the basis of the Treaty as an 'incomplete contract' (Stone Sweet 2004) , as well as the complexity and insufficiency of established rules, the Court enjoys considerable discretion to apply, interpret and clarify the meaning of Community law and policy; and it becomes correspondingly difficult for politics to withstand such legal interpretations of the 'law of the land'.
The following analysis details how the national autonomy to determine the spatial borders of health consumption and supply has been restrained, re-established and compromised anew by Community law. It demonstrates a Court that historically has been politically restrained, but which recently -in the absence of political voice -has been capable of acting both cautiously and ambitiously at one and the same time, thus extending the rights of the European patient.
On the basis of a process-tracing study, five chronologically structured sections will examine in the following how the scope and limits of intra-European healthcare have been drawn over time. Upon this examination, the article will finally examine contemporary patient mobility in the EU and return to the question of political impact and why politics has not reigned in a Court, whose legal reasoning has made the European Union extend to the core of the welfare state.
The Scope and Limits of European Healthcare
European citizens moving or travelling from one member state to another enjoy a right to immediate healthcare in the other member state as well as to other kinds of publicly financed health treatment, provided that they have been authorised beforehand by the competent national institution. 4 Apart from compromising the territoriality of healthcare, this means that the member states place their healthcare system at the disposal of one another's nationals (Neumann-Duesberg 1999: 25) .
From the outset, only the migrant worker and his family enjoyed the right to cross-border institutions to pay for the costs of treatment abroad, which domestic health policies did not provide for, then the; "scope of those provisions would be distorted since they would have the effect of creating an independent social security law of the Community instead of merely coordinating the social security law of the member states" (ECR 1978, p. 831 , emphasis added).
The Court overruled these political warnings on harmonisation effects, laying down that regardless whether or not the treatment was part of the national health package, a competent institution was obliged to authorise treatment in another member state if the foreign treatment had been recognised as necessary and effective.
"The duty laid down in the second subparagraph of Article 22 (2) 10 to grant the authorisation required under
Article 22 (1) (c) covers both cases where the treatment provided in another Member State is more effective than that which the person concerned can receive in the Member State where he resides and those in which the treatment in question cannot be provided on the territory of the latter State" (Para. 22 of Pierik I, emphasis added).
In the case of the Pierik judgement, the Court clarified that in the relationship between Community law and national authorisation policies, the decisive element determining whether or not the patient was entitled to foreign treatment at public expense was that person's state of health, and not whether the relevant treatment was part of the healthcare scheme in the individual member state.
The decisions thus potentially opened up for the possibility of 'regime shopping' (Ferrera 2003: 634) . The judgements stand as the very early recognition of the patient's right to travel within the Community for healthcare. By limiting the discretionary authorisation power of the competent institution, the long-term consequence could have been harmonisation at the highest level. This was a possible scenario, since patients shopping around Europe at the expense of their competent state would indirectly encourage, and perhaps even oblige, member states to establish the same kind of treatments (Eichenhofer 1999: 52) .
Such 'top-up' effects of the Pierik cases never happened, however, due to the political reaction. The prompt Council reaction to the legal deduction proves that a judicial doctrine in formation ultimately must be politically supported, and that if individual litigation proceeds excessively in terms of financial and political implications, the member states will seek to mobilise joint action against the Court's interpretative course. In this case, the Council successfully re-established the 10 I.e. of Regulation 1408/71. discretionary power of national authorities by unanimously amending the provision in secondary legislation, the meaning of which had been expanded by the interpretation of the Court. 11 The amendment directly corrected the interpretations by the Court and the new provision clarified political intentions, thus re-balancing competencies in favour of the member state. Thus reformulated, the provision specified that the competent institution was obliged to authorise treatment abroad, only when it was administratively and medically considered necessary, and only when that treatment was part of the national healthcare package.
Having initiated the establishment of a supranational system of healthcare beyond the control of the member state, which could fundamentally compromise the ability of member states to decide on the content of national healthcare, the Court was politically restrained. For almost two decades, national authorisation policies seemed sacred, with an established balance between national and Community competencies. That was prior to the Decker/Kohll ruling of 1998.
Authorisation Policies before the Internal Market
The established order between national health policy and Community law was seriously upset by the rulings of Decker 12 and Kohll 13 in 1998, and not least by their aftermath. The Decker/Kohll cases were landmark rulings, clarifying that the Community principles regarding the free movement of goods and services also regulate national health policies. The importance of the rulings was stressed widely by academics and national presses, whereas the majority of member states met the judgements with official silence (Eichenhofer 1999b: 102; Eichenhofer 2001: 237; Hervey 2000: 40; Kötter 2000: 28; Maydell 1999: 9; Mossialos et al. 2001: 45; Novak 1998: 366; Palm 2000: 105) . Their full impact remains difficult to detect, since subsequent cases provide answers to some of the questions raised by the Decker/Kohll procedure, while they pose new questions themselves. 15 The joint viewpoint was that the free movement principles concerned had no influence on the policy field of social security. The governments further argued that the prior authorisation procedure was a necessary instrument to:
 Maintain the financial equilibrium of the healthcare system;  Ensure the general quality of the health goods and services provided, thus protecting public health;
 Ensure the maintenance of balanced medical and hospital services available to all.
The ECJ initiated its line of reasoning by stating "Community law does not detract from the powers of the Member States to organise their social security systems" (para. 17 Kohll; para. 21 Decker).
That being admitted, the Court nonetheless dismissed that the basic principles of free movement
should not apply to the policy field of social security . The legal reasoning thus made clear that member states did retain the authority and discretion to organise the policy domain of social security, but only within certain limits (Palm et al. 2000: 70) .
Furthermore, the ECJ dismissed the national justifications for the authorisation procedure, concluding that the Luxembourg requirement of prior authorisation represented an unjustified 14 Both treatments are benefits reimbursed by the Luxembourg sickness insurance fund when bought within Luxembourg. 15 In the Decker case, Luxembourg, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and the United Kingdom gave written opinions. In the Kohll case, Greece, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Austria joined Luxembourg.
barrier to the principles of free movement, which discouraged insured persons to seek health goods and services beyond national borders (para. 36 Decker; para 35 Kohll).
The intermediate outcome of the now-famous rulings was a new set of questions that called for administrative, political, and legal responses (Palm et al. 2000: 105; Mossialos et al. 2001: 48) .
What autonomy did the member states now have to condition access to healthcare abroad? Did the conclusions apply to all of the different social security systems, or only to systems of reimbursement such as in Luxembourg? 16 Did the conclusions also apply to hospital services?
While awaiting a political reaction, new cases were brought before the Court.
National Discretion Compromised
The Decker and Kohll cases concerned services provided outside of the hospital sector.
Furthermore, the cases treated the specific Luxembourg health insurance system, which is characterised by its subsequent reimbursement of treatment costs. Since the Decker-Kohll rulings, the scope of the established procedure has been questioned, and further legal clarification been Peerbooms, the competent Dutch institution refused to reimburse the costs of care. The reimbursement request was turned down with reference to the fact that Dutch health policy considered the therapy to be experimental, and that no scientific evidence of its effectiveness was provided.
Both the cases of Smits and Peerbooms concerned treatments that were not considered 'standard' by Dutch health policy, and consequently were not covered by the national social security system.
According to Dutch law, prior authorisation for treatment abroad is granted if two conditions are fulfilled; 1) the proposed treatment must be among the benefits for which the competent institution assumes responsibility, meaning that the treatment must be regarded as "normal in the professional circles concerned", and 2) that the required treatment is necessary and not available without "undue delay" in the Netherlands.
The Court was requested to clarify three aspects of the relationship between Community law and national health policy: did the freedom to provide services apply to hospital care? And, if so, did the national prior authorisation policy violate the Treaty provision? Finally, if affirmed, could the authorisation system still be justified?
The cases of Smits and Peerbooms received great political attention. No less than 10 member governments submitted their opinions to the Court. 18 A basic viewpoint held by the member states was that hospital care did not constitute a service within the meaning of the Treaty, i.e. within the Treaty's article 50, and therefore the free movement provision did not apply. 19 The opinion advanced was that, since hospital care represented an in-kind service, free of charge, it was not an 18 The member states delivering opinions were the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Portugal, Finland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom. Furthermore, the EEA states of Iceland and Norway gave opinion. The Court did not uphold the national argument. To the contrary, it was stated as settled case-law that medical activities fell within the scope of the Treaty's article 50, without distinction as to whether the services were provided inside or outside of a hospital environment (para. 53 of the judgement). 21 The Court thereby confirmed that the Decker/Kohll procedure applied, in principle, to all forms of healthcare, whether based on in-kind benefits or reimbursement (Mossialos et. al. 2001: 49).
The ECJ subsequently made clear that the requirement to apply for prior authorisation constituted a barrier to the freedom to provide services (para. 69 of the judgement). 22 However, the Court also found that prior authorisation could in fact be justified as a 'necessary and reasonable' instrument to guarantee a balanced and assessable hospital sector, which depended on planning and contracting (paras. 76-80 of the judgement). exclusively from a national medical perspective, it is "likely that Netherlands providers of treatment will always be preferred in practice" (para. 96 of the judgment).
The second Dutch condition for the authorisation of treatment abroad, allowing such authorisation only when the necessary treatment cannot be delivered in the Netherlands without "undue delay", was furthermore interpreted on a non-discriminatory basis by the Court. The ECJ concluded that, "once it is clear that treatment covered by the national insurance system cannot be provided by a contracted establishment, it is not acceptable that national hospitals not having any contractual arrangements with the insured person's sickness insurance fund be given priority over hospitals in other Member States" (para. 107 of the judgment, emphasis added).
In other words, once it is evident that a treatment cannot be provided by a contracted provider in the Netherlands, the Court hereby clarified that the Dutch sickness fund cannot favour a noncontracted, i.e. private, provider established in the Netherlands over a provider in another member state (Mossialos et al. 2001: 53) . When purchasing treatment beyond the contracted providers, the principle of non-discrimination rules.
Furthermore, when determining whether an effective treatment can be provided without "undue delay" from a contracted provider, "the national authorities are required to have regard to all the circumstances of each specific case and to take due account not only of the patient's medical condition at the time when authorisation is sought but also of his past record" (para. 104 of the judgement).
With the Smits-Peerbooms ruling, the Court confirmed and extended the Decker-Kohll procedure to the hospital sector as well as to social security systems based on benefits-in-kind. The conclusions of the Smits-Peerbooms case have since been restated in case C-56/01 Inizan. 23 By restating its previous conclusions in the Inizan case and re-emphasising the non-discriminatory provision, the Court highlights the significance of the patient's position, transparency and legal certainty:
"According to the case-law of the Court, in order for such a prior administrative authorisation scheme to be justified even though it derogates from a fundamental freedom such as that in issue in the main proceedings, it is none the less necessary that it be based on objective, non-discriminatory criteria which are known in advance, in such a way as to circumscribe the exercise of the national authorities' discretion, so that it is not used arbitrarily
[…] such a prior administrative authorisation scheme must, similarly, be based on a procedural system which is easily accessible and capable of ensuring that a request for authorisation will be dealt with objectively and impartially within a reasonable time and refusals to grant authorisation must also be capable of being challenged in judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings (para. 57 of C-56/01 Inizan, emphasis added).
While the Court has confirmed the competence of the member states to control the supply of health services through the instrument of prior authorisation, at the same time it has intervened in the national autonomy to exercise such an instrument. In the absence of political voice, the position of the European patient has been significantly empowered by the Court. In the future, the patient seeking treatment abroad will be able to challenge administrative discretion from national authorities, relying on European law. Granting European citizens the right to try prior authorisation decisions in judicial or quasi-judicial ways suggests that the Court will not tolerate "blanket refusals" from national authorities in the future (Mossialos and Palm 2003: 21) . While they essentially justify authorisation policies, the cases of Smits-Peerbooms and the later Inizan case are powerful demonstrations of judicial activism discreetly intervening in, conditioning, and compromising the political and administrative scope of manoeuvre.
The Evolving Internal Market for Non-Hospital Healthcare
Like the other cases on national healthcare and Community law, the later case of "give rise to patients travelling to other countries in such large number, despite linguistic barriers, geographic distance, the cost of staying abroad and lack of information about the kind of care provided there, that the financial balance of the Netherlands social security system would be seriously upset and that, as a result, the overall level of public-health protection would be jeopardised -which might constitute proper justification for a barrier to the fundamental principle of freedom to provide services (para. 95 of the judgement, emphasis added).
The Court thus reasoned contextually, considering the political arguments in the light of their socioeconomic background, and refused the national justification for maintaining the control instrument of prior authorisation in the case of non-hospital care. Furthermore, the "might" in the last sentence indicates that what ultimately justifies a barrier to the freedom to provide services has by no means been finally settled, but is likely to be subject to further clarification in future cases.
Whereas the vast majority of member governments initially rejected the applicability of the 
Patient Mobility and Healthcare Developments in the European Union
Considering the institutionalised rights in its practical, societal context, patient mobility has thus far remained relatively low. As the table below demonstrates, patients have rarely requested treatment abroad. Palm et al,. 2000: 44-62; Mossialos et al,. 2002: 85; Commission Staff Working Paper 2003) The figures on people requesting and obtaining treatment abroad are based on three different sources, of which the most recent data are provided in the Commission Staff Working Paper. These figures are incomplete and only listed for the member states that have provided data. The table demonstrates that we lack sufficient quantitative data on patient mobility in Europe. On the basis of available data, however, we see that the member states differ significantly regarding the extent to which they grant prior authorisation to treatment abroad. The health systems in Luxembourg and
Italy have integrated the health supply of other member states much more significantly than for example their northern counter parts, where healthcare remains territorialized. In general, however, cross border healthcare within the European Union only amounts to a negligible part of the total health expenditures in the EU, in 1998 representing no more than 0.50% of total health expenditures (Palm et. al., 2000; Vollard 2004 ).
However, the figures above mirror patient mobility in the very wake of ECJ litigation. The precedent established through the case-law will need to be transposed into national legislation and adopted in administrative practices and patients will need to be informed of their rights before the political impact of legal integration will become measurable. Nevertheless, Denmark provides an example of what could be expected. The member state was one the few which revised parts of the national health policy in response to the Decker and Kohll cases and which later adjusted a national health reform, addressing the problem of waiting lists, brining it into compliance with the principles generated in the case of Smits and Peerbooms (Martinsen forthcoming). As seen in the table above, Denmark has experienced a recent increase in the authorisation of treatment provided abroad.
Should member states not respond in accordance with the jurisprudence of the European Court, patients and private or public foreign hospitals are likely to mobilise domestically and invoke their intra-European rights (Börzel 2000) . The ambitions set out in the communication and declared by the Commissioner for health are undoubtedly high. The objective to equip the European citizen with access to foreign health supply must result in an array of different initiatives aiming to settle the relationship between Community law and national competencies and policies, between supranational and national healthcare rights.
To fulfil the long term strategy is, however, formulated as 'an essential endeavour', presented as a logical chain, where means and aims bind into one another:
"Achieving these aims will be a long-term and complex project, and may require further proposals in the future. It is nevertheless an essential endeavour. Over time this strategy will repay dividends in better health and quality of life. It will contribute to better use of the resources invested in health systems across Europe. It will promote greater economic growth and more sustainable development for the Union as a whole. And most tangibly for citizens, it will bring concrete benefits for European integration closer to people in their daily lives" (COM (2004) 301: 3).
The vision embedded in this wider strategy is difficult to argue against in a Union seeking its social self as well as seeking to increase its appeal to the peoples of Europe. However, its implementation will irrevocably reduce the political autonomy to decide on the consumption and, depending on future evolvement, the content of healthcare policies.
The content of the recent cluster of case-law and the communication is further concretised in the Commission's proposal for a Directive on services in the internal market. 28 In the light of the Court's decisions, article 23 of the new directive proposes 1) an internal market for non-hospital care, where the patient has a right to seek treatment in another member state without prior authorisation and subsequently have the costs reimbursed by the competent national institution, 2) a right to hospitalisation in another member state, provided that the member state of affiliation offers the same treatment, and that authorisation has been granted beforehand. The national discretion to decide on authorisation has, however, been reduced, since the provision clarifies that the patient is entitled to authorisation if the national health system cannot provide the care within a medically acceptable time limit considering the individual health conditions.
The directive proposal thus aims to codify the Court's interpretation of the scope and limits of intraEuropean healthcare.
Furthermore, the accessibility of European health has been clearly improved on a different dimension. Two other initiatives are likely to contribute to the content and reach of the European health market.
As part of the wider strategy, a separate communication sets out the intention to extend the 'open methods of coordination' to healthcare and long-term care. Best practices and the evaluation of national strategies will then be discussed and examined through the Community tool of soft-law. A further communication sets out an 'e-health action plan', which intends to use information technology to help improve access and quality for health services within the European Union.
Despite the fact that communications are likely to be delayed before they are transposed into real policy-commitment, the picture is clear.
The intension to inform the European citizen regarding his/her cross-border rights is in itself likely to spur the integration process. Furthermore, patient mobility and demands for cross-border care are likely to be further stimulated by contemporary facts such as waiting lists, the increased general cross-border movements by European citizens, and growing integration in border regions (Mossialos and Palm 2003: 7) . With increased information about healthcare options across borders, patients will try their rights before national administrations, European law will be tried before 29 That is, the European Union as well as Norway, Iceland, Liechtenstein. The agreement also includes Switzerland. 30 The card replaces the E111 form used by tourists; E110 used by international road transporters; E128 used by students and people working in another member state; and E119 used by people registered as unemployed and seeking work in another member state.
national courts, and eventually the ECJ will be requested to clarify new aspects. In this way, should member states be reluctant to implement rights, then they may simply be bypassed by 'transnational constituencies' (Pollack 1998: 221-222) . 'Transnational constituencies' between the European Court, national courts and the European citizens acting as litigants constitute a means of counterbalancing the influence of member states in the legal integration process. The stronger the link between the supranational organisation and its constituencies, the more institutionalised supranational rules become and the greater the costs of non-compliance by the member states. In this way, the rights of European patients and hence their mobility are likely to be spurred of their own accord.
Concluding Remarks
Recent legal deductions have taken a decisive step towards an internal market for non-hospital care, as well as having compromised the authority of the member states when deciding on granting authorisation for hospitalisation abroad. Politics has yet to interfere thus far. Voices have been heard, but not in unison. In the absence of political guidance, the Court has continued to decide autonomously on the scope and limits of an internal health market.
The political impact of this specific process of integration through law is, however, clear. The process fundamentally compromises the political autonomy to demarcate healthcare within own borders. The interpretations of the European Court have provided exit options for EU patients (Vollard 2004) , and the Court has established an alternative to insufficient national health services.
The application of internal market principles means that both the national monopoly to supply public healthcare and the territorialisation thereof are essentially challenged.
The consequences are political, and the response to legal integration need be political as well. The legal institutionalisation of supranational rights intervenes in the social contract between the nation state and its citizens. The performance of healthcare systems is a key component of governmental legitimacy (Vollard ibid.) , but capacity problems have thus far relied on national solutions. An EUbased alternative has now been provided. Whether this will significantly increase patient mobility or not essentially depends on the political response and whether national health services satisfy public demands. In this way, political autonomy is also reduced. With an EU health dimension, national health systems must satisfy the demands of citizens who, from a supranational locus of rights, have been granted exit options, and thus will compare the national supplies with those on the other side of the border and request on this behalf. The full-scale political impact remains to be seen and depends on patient mobilisation, political response, national implementation of supranational rights, and not least further judicial clarifications.
As for the relation between law and politics, the question remains how healthcare integration could become the offspring of free movement provision and despite a fairly ambiguous and vague Treaty text and why politics has not restrained the expansive judicial reading of Community principles?
The integration process, as depicted above, demonstrates the ability of the European Court of Justice to apply the fundamental provision of free movement to a policy field, which not so long ago was held largely insulated from Community law. Sweet et al. 2001) . Secondly, in part, the premises of integration through law originate from the complexity of the European polity and from the case-tocase construction of meaning formulated by judicial decision-making. In a political and legal entity where the issue-density between policy fields and principles is high and where the limits of rational institutional design 32 are evident, complexity is one premise extending the scope of manoeuvre of the Court. Rather than the "mask of law" (Burley and Mattli 1993) , it appears as though the opacity of legal integration itself shields it from political intervention (Rasmussen 1998: 539-541 ). It may not be judicial activism, which is difficult for politics to see through and counterbalance, but the facts that a) EU law evolves through piecemeal interpretations, that b) the consequences and course thereof are difficult to predict, and that c) the Court is capable of acting both cautiously and 32 For the theoretical elaboration of the limits of rational institutional design, see Pierson 2000. ambitiously at one and the same time. 33 Thirdly, although the ECJ has no autonomous capacity to pursue integrative agendas and although its rate of success ultimately depends on the political response to its decisions, it is clear that when politics must counterbalance judicial decision-making, it finds its own logic working against it. Politics and law appear to be two distinct spheres that respond to very different logics (Alter 1998; . Lawyers and judges evidently take a long-term interest in the evolution of law, whereas politicians tend to have short-term interests and react to judicial activism for its immediate impact and not for its potential impact. For lawyers and judges, case law is interesting for its establishment of precedent. For politicians, the rather short-term material impact of a case is what renders it significant -or not. In part, non-action is explained by the restricted time horizon of political actors (Pierson 1996) . Fourthly, a different explanation of non-action is that politicians tend to refuse that controversial litigation also applies to their national systems. By declining the multilateral effect of Community law, national policies are shielded from supranational interference -at least in the short to medium run (Martinsen 2004) . Fifthly, the institutional barriers confronting member government, should they wish to restrain the Court, have become considerably higher by enlargement. The depicted course of healthcare integration substantiates that Community law is a supranational source of individual rights, which through the empowerment of the European patients augments enforceable and material meaning to the skeleton of European citizenship. This development has taken place at the threshold to a Constitution for Europe. What has occurred on the basis of an ambiguous and rather vague Treaty basis suggests that with the charter of fundamental rights inserted in the Constitution, we should expect much more from social Europe in the future. 33 For this ambiguity of the Court's actions and its integrative course, see Craig and de Búrca 1998: 78-79. 
